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KOREAN BANKRUPTCY LAW:
THE HEAVY DUTY
HYPOTHETICAL APPLIED*

James L. Garrity, Jr.** & Karen P. Ramdhanie***
I. INTRODUCTION
In Korea, a domestic company facing financial difficulties that cannot
negotiate an agreement with its creditors has two options. Either it can file
for bankruptcy under the Korean Bankruptcy Act ("BA") and thereby place
its assets in the control of a court appointed receiver who will liquidate
them, or it can file for reorganization under the Corporate Reorganization
Act ("CRA").' A company is not assured relief under the CRA and that
option is not particularly attractive to management because it is divested
of control of the company in favor of a court appointed receiver who must
promptly propose a reorganization plan. The reorganization process may
also be expensive' and the viability of a given case is largely dependant
upon secured and priority creditors cooperation. 3 Moreover, there is a
stigma associated with filing a case under the BA or CRA. Nonetheless,
we find that Heavy Duty likely would opt for relief under the CRA.

* © James L. Garrity, Jr. and Karen P. Ramdhanie, 1997.

All rights reserved.

** United States Bankruptcy Court Judge, Southern District of New York. J.D., St.
Johns University, 1980, LL.M. New York University School of Law 1986.

*** JD/MBA student at New York Law School and Baruch College. Associate,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP.
1. Korean Corporate Reorganization Act, Law No. 1214, (1962), amended by Law No.
5380 (1981) & Law No. 3724, art. 23 (1984) [hereinafter CRA]; Ihlpyo Hong, A
Comparative Study of American and Korean CorporateReorganization Laws, BUSINESS
LAWS IN KOREA , 376, at 381 (Chan-Jin Kim ed., 1988).
2. For a discussion on the costs incurred during reorganization, see generally infra
Parts HIL.B, Part IV.A.

3. Id.
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H. RELIEF FROM INDEBTEDNESS

A. Bankruptcy
A company that is unable to pay its debts qualifies for relief under the
The BA is effective only as to property.5 Cases under the BA are
commenced voluntarily by the debtor or involuntarily by creditors.6 A
director of the company or a liquidator may commence a voluntary case
Creditors may commence
on the debtor's behalf under the BA.7
A petitioning creditor is not required to hold a
involuntary cases.'
particular amount of debt, however, it must provide prima facie proof of
its claim and cause for commencing the case.9 A company's failure to pay
its debts is prima facie evidence of cause for relief under the BA.' 0
Involuntary bankruptcy cases are rare."
Upon the commencement of a case under the BA, management is
divested of possession and control of the debtor's assets, the debtor ceases
to operate and a court appointed receiver charged with the responsiblity of
liquidating the debtor's assets takes control of the debtor's property. 2 A
case under the BA ends when the debtor's assets have been liquidated and
the proceeds distributed to creditors, 3 the creditors unanimously agree to
end the case, 14 or when the cost of the bankruptcy have exceeded the value
of the estate."5 Distributions to creditors are governed by statutory
priorities. The receiver's expenses are paid up front.
BA. 4

4. Bankruptcy Act, Law No. 998, art. 116 (1962), anended by Law No. 4472 (1991)
[hereinafter BA].
5. Id. art. 3.
6. Id. art. 122(1).
7. Id. art.123.
8. Id. art.122(1).
9. Id. art.122(2).

10. Id. art. 116(2); See also KLYNVELD PEAT MARWICK GOERDELER, INTERNATIONAL
189 (1988) [hereinafter KPMG].
11. KPMG at 190 (stating that only the directors of a company may apply for
bankruptcy proceedings).
INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES

12. CRA art. 23.
13. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIGEST, Republic of Korea, Kor-2 (1996)

[hearinafter MHLDJ.
14. BA art. 319(1).
15. Id. arts. 135(1) & 325(1); MHLD supra note 13, at Kor-2 (1996).
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B. Reorganization
Relief under the CRA is available only to stock companies. A debtor
is eligible for relief under the CRA if it is unable to pay its debts yet is
able to continue in business, or if the conditions of bankruptcy exist.' 6 The
latter includes the debtor's inability to pay its debts.' 7 "Conditions of
bankruptcy" are present where the debtor either has ceased to pay its debts
in the ordinary course of business, 8 or it is unable to pay debts when they
become due.' 9
A shareholder holding at least 10% of the company's total shares may
commence a case under the CRA on behalf of the company, provided the
company is otherwise eligible for relief under the statute.20 Similarly,
creditor(s) with claims equal to at least 10% of the company's capital may
file an involuntary case against a debtor under the CRA, provided the
company is otherwise eligible for relief under the statute.2 A petitioning
creditor must make a prima facie showing that it is eligible to file the
petition and that the requisite condition of bankruptcy exists. 22 Large
creditors have standing to object to involuntary petitions. 2 3 The court will
seriously consider the creditor's objections, but may not reject the
petition. 24 Instead, the court 25 can limit the injunction against creditors
seeking to satisfy their rights to assets.2 6 A petitioning creditor may appeal
any unfavorable court decision concerning the reorganization proceeding. 7
Before relief under the CRA is granted, a debtor must show that it can
reorganize its business and that the creditors and shareholders will probably
consent.28 If the court is not persuaded it will order the debtor liquidated

16. CRA art. 30(1); Hong, supra note 1, at 381; KPMG, supra note 10, at 189.
17. BA arts. 116 & 117.
18. KPMG, supra note 10, at 189.
19. Id. at 190.
20.
21.
22.
23.

CRA arts. 30(i) & 30(2).
Id.
Id. art. 33(1).
Hong, supra note 1, at 382.

24. Id.
25. There is no specialized bankruptcy court in Korea. Cases under the CRA are
commenced in Korea's District Court. See infra part III, sec. A.
26. Id.
27. CRA art. 50(1).
28. Hong, supra note 1, at 382.
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under the BA or convert the case to a composition proceeding. 29 Thus, the
court, not the petitioner, determines the proper relief for the debtor
company. 30 Among other factors, the court will consider the size and type
of business conducted by the debtor, 3' and whether there is a public
demand for the debtor's products. 32 The court can appoint one or more
Investigation Commissioners to assist in determining whether a company
is entitled to relief under the CRA.33 If the court grants the petition, it
issues a number of administrative orders 34 and appoints a receiver who
The
must propose a reorganization plan within two months.35
reorganization proceeding is terminated if the draft reorganization plan is
not timely submitted to creditors.36 The court may discontinue the
proceedings if the Receiver or the debtor company applies for a
discontinuation of the proceedings because it is clear that the company is
able to make complete payment to all reorganization creditors,31 or if the
court or the Receiver applies for a discontinuation of the proceedings
because it is clear that the approved plan will fail.3 8

C. Heavy Duty
A family owned company such as Heavy Duty would first approach
its creditors in an attempt to negotiate more favorable terms of credit.
Failing this attempt at easing its financial burdens, Heavy Duty would then
consider a reorganization of its business practices. The directors of Heavy
Duty would wish to avoid filing for bankruptcy because the economic and
social repercussions to the company and its directors are severe under the
BA. As a consequence of filing for bankruptcy, a Korean company can be
labelled bankrupt for ten years before it is reinstated as a viable enterprise.
Finally, the family members, directors and managers of Heavy Duty may

29. See infra Part III, sec. A.
30. Hong, supra note 1, at 382.
31. Id. at 382.
32. Id. at 382 (operating statements and other evidence of company's fundamental
worth must be presented).
33. See infra Part III, sec. B.
34. Those include without limitation, a bar date order and a date for the first meeting
of interested persons.
35. See infra Part III, sec. C.
36. CRA art. 272(1).
37. Id. art. 273(1).
38. Id. art. 276.
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want to avoid the stigma of having a family owned business being
adjudicated bankrupt.3 9 Therefore, Heavy Duty will likely opt for relief
under the CRA.

m. THE PLAYERS

IN A KOREAN

REORGANIZATION PROCEEDING

The following parties commonly appear in the reorganization process:
the Court, the Investigation Commissioner(s), 40 the Receiver(s), 4' and the
Creditors' committee/Inspection Commissioners. The debtor, however,
42
does not play a part in the process once a Receiver is appointed.
A. The Court
Petitions commencing cases under the CRA are filed in the District
Court. It is not a specialized court. Upon receipt of a CRA petition, the
court will preserve the assets of the company by issuing an order similar
in scope to the automatic stay of § 362 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code,4 3 and/or it may appoint one or more Investigation Commissioners to
investigate the cause for reorganization.' The District Court where the
principal office of the company is located or, if the principal office is
located abroad, where the company's principal place of business in Korea
is located, has jurisdiction over the reorganization case.45
If the court approves the reorganization petition, it will simultaneously
4
appoint a Receiver, 46 order a report of claims,41 set the timeframe for filing
claims, 48 set the date for the first meeting of interested persons, 49 and set

39. See BA supra note 4 & accompanying text.
40. CRA art. 40.
41. Id. art. 94.
42. Id. art. 53(1) (providing that receiver has exclusive control over assets of company).
43. CRA arts. 37, 39, 67; KPMG, supra note 10, at 190 (Preserving the assets of the
company is similar to the US automatic stay: no payment; no compulsory executions; no
auction sales of assets; and no provisional attachments, unless authorized by the court).
44. CRA art. 40.

45. Id. art. 6(1).
46. Id. arts. 46 & 94; Hong, surpa note 1, at 383; KPMG supra note 10 at 190.
47. CRA art. 46(1); Hong, supra note 1, at 382.
48. CRA art. 273(1).
49. Id.
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the date on which to investigate all claims.5 ° The Court also will authorize
the Receiver to draft the reorganization plan.5 ' The reorganization plan
should show the names of creditors, the amount owed to each creditor, the
repayment period for each debt, other details of obligations, and the interest
rates.52
Even if the court allows a reorganization proceeding to begin, it may
dismiss the proceeding or disapprove of the reorganization plan if it
believes that there is no chance of rehabilitation or that the petition was not
filed in good faith.5 3 If the court dismisses the reorganization proceeding,
the debtor may be declared bankrupt.5 4 The court may 55also convert a
reorganization proceeding into a composition proceeding.
B. Investigation Commissioner
The Investigation Commissioner investigates the reasons for
reorganization, the existence or non-existence of the causes as outlined in
the CRA, art 38, sections 2-7; the state of the business and the assets of
the company; the necessity for preservative measures; and other matters
related to the reorganization.5 6 He is appointed by the court and
necessarily performs his duties before the court authorizes a reorganization
case to go forward.57 The Investigation Commissioner may demand reports
from the debtors' directors, auditors, managers and employees, and has
broad authority to examine the debtor's books, financial records and other
documents.5 8 The Investigation Commissioner may appoint appraisers,5 9
or receive assistance from bailiff(s), if necessary.60 The Investigation
Commissioner will report to the court on the feasibility of the proposed

50. Id.
51. KPMG, supra note 10,

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

at 190.

Id. at 191.
CRA art. 38; Hong, supra note 1, at 382.
CRA art. 23(1).
Id. art. 27.
Id. art. 40.
Id. axrts. 40-44.

58. Id.art. 41(1).
59. Id. art. 41(2).
60. Id. art. 41(3).
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reorganization.6 ' The duties of the Investigation Commissioner
62
the commencement of the reorganization proceedings.
An Investigation Commissioner is a disinterested person possessing
knowledge and experience relevant to the business of the company that is
the subject of the CRA case.63 The court fixes his compensation based on
the duties and responsibilities involved. 64 His expenses are paid in
advance.65 Investigation Commissioners can be held jointly and severally
liable for losses if they fail to exercise care in performing their duty.66
It is very likely that because Heavy Duty is a family-owned business
that the court will appoint one or more Investigation Commissioner(s) to
review its causes for reorganization. After receiving the Investigation
Commissioner's opinion, the court will decide whether to approve the
commencement of the reorganization proceeding. Assuming it does, the
court will appoint one or more Receiver(s). Where there are more than
one Receiver, one of the Receivers may be a member of Heavy Duty.
C. Receiver
A Receiver is appointed after the court approves the commencement
The Receiver prepares the
of the reorganization proceeding.67
reorganization plan 68 and must submit it to court within two months of his
appointment. 69 To do so, the Receiver may obtain reports of creditors'
claims and obligations from the Investigation Commissioner(s). 7" The
Receiver may also demand reports from the debtor's directors, auditors,
managers and employees, and may examine the books, documents, monies
and other things of the company. 7' With court permission, the Receiver
may dispose of assets, take transfer of property, obtain loans, 72 take legal
action, settle, relinquish rights, approve claims of common benefits and

61. Hong, supra note 1, at 383.
62. Id.
63. CRA art. 40(2).
64. Id. arts. 284(1) & (2).
65. Id. art. 284(1).
66. Id. art. 43(2).
67. Id. arts. 41-44, 101 (articles 41 through 44 apply to receivers).

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. art. 189.
KPMG, supra note 10, at 190.
CRA art. 189.
Id. art. 41.

72. Id. art. 103.
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rights to redeem, 73 recover property, and rescind contracts. 74 The Receiver,
however, may not reduce capital, issue new shares or debentures, merge or
consolidate company, distribute profits or revise the articles of
incorporation.7"
The court will select the Receiver 76 and will determine the Receiver's
remuneration," based on the duties and responsibilities involved.78
Furthermore, the Receiver's expenses are paid in advance.79 Where there
are several Receivers, one may be an interested party, even a director of
the debtor.80 The Receivers may either perform their duties conjointly, or
they may be assigned specific responsibilities.8" Trust Companies and
Banks may be appointed as Receivers.8 2
Once a Receiver is appointed, the family members of Heavy Duty will
no longer be in control of the company.83 The Receiver will have
exclusive control over the assets of and claims against Heavy Duty. 4 In
Korea, however, there are no provisions for tort claims in either bankruptcy
proceeding or reorganization proceeding. 5 Therefore, while the Receiver
in this case may rescind the lease with City of Hope, 6 it may prefer not
to do so because it would have to incur the cost of building a new
manufacturing plant.
D. Creditors' Committee
The Creditors' Committee must first approve the reorganization plan. 7
The reorganization creditors, reorganization security holders, shareholders,
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. art. 54.
Id. art. 78; Hong, supra note 1, at 385.
CRA art. 52(1).
Id. art. 94.
Id. art. 284(1).
Id. art. 284(2)
Id. art. 284(1).
Hong, supra note 1,at 385.
CRA art. 97.

82. Id. art. 95; Hong, supra note 1, at 385.
83. CRA art. 53(1).
84. Id.
85. SANG HYUN SONG, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF KOREA

925 (1984).

86. CRA art. 103.
87. KPMG, supra note 10, at 190.
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and agent commissioners who have contributed to the reorganization may
be compensated for expenses out of the assets of the company 8 8
IV. PRIoRrrY AMONG CREDITORS
The CRA gives priority to claims in the following order: (a) claims
of common benefits, 8 9 (b) reorganization security rights, (c) reorganization
claims with general preferential rights, (d) other reorganization claims,9" (e)
deferred reorganization claims, 9' and (f) shareholders' residual claims. 92
A. Claims of Common Benefits
Claims of common benefits generally are paid prior to all other
claims9 3 and outside .the reorganization process. They include the cost of
the judicial proceedings, the management cost after the commencement of
the reorganization proceeding, the cost of executing the reorganization plan,
all employees compensation and retirement allowances, all monies owed
to financial institutions lending after commencement of reorganization, all
payments for the services of the Investigating Commissioner(s), the
Receiver(s) and other court appointed persons,94 and all current tax
claims. 95 The $2.5m claim of Heavy Duty's retired employees is a claim
of common benefits. 96 Heavy Duty must pay that expense and other costs
of the reorganization proceeding in advance. 97 If it cannot do so, the court
can dismiss the case.98

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

CRA arts. 284 & 286.
Id. arts. 208 & 209; Hong, supra note 1, at 385; KPMG, supra note 10, at 191.
CRA arts. 159 & 228.
Id. art. 121.
Id. arts. 159 & 228.

93. Id. art. 209(1),(2).
94. Id. arts. 208, 284, 286.
95. Id. arts. 208, 209; Hong, supra note 1, at 386; KPMG at 191.

96. Id. art. 208.
97. Id. art. 34(1).
98. Id. art. 38.
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B. Reorganization Security Rights
Reorganization security holders entitled to second priority status, 99
include those with security interests in the building and equipment of the
debtor."° In this case, the bankers have security rights in the office
building, physical plant and the equipment. They are secured only to the
value of the collateral and unsecured for amounts exceeding the value of
the collateral.' 0'
C. Reorganization Claims With General PreferentialRight
Reorganization claimants with general preference rights or other
general priority rights are'0 2 secured up to 10
the3 value of their collateral and
are unsecured creditors for any deficiency.
D. Other Reorganization Claims
Other reoTganization claims"° include reorganization creditors without
prior claims or without deferred claims (unsecured creditors),' and tax
claims. 0 6 Unsecured creditors' claims are subject to the reorganization
plan.'0 7 However, if Heavy Duty's reorganization threatens small or
medium sized creditors with financial ruin of their own, the court may
direct that Heavy Duty pay their claims outside of the reorganization
plan.108 In deciding whether that relief is appropriate, the court will
consider the transaction between Heavy Duty and the creditor, the financial
condition of the creditor, the interest of others, and all other relevant
circumstances.' 0 9
Tax claims are given special protection in a reorganization plan."0
99. Id. arts. 159, 228.
100. See generally Id. art. 106; Hong, supra note 1, at 386.
101. Id. art. 124(2).
102. Id. art. 159 [the CRA does note define reorganization claimants with general
preference rights.]
103. Id. art. 124.
104. Id. art. 228.
105. Id. arts. 121, 159; Hong, supra note 1, at 386.
106. Id. art. 122.
107. Id.arts. 21, 124, 125, 159, 229.
108. Id.art. 112-2(1).
109. Id. art. 112-2(2).
110. Id.art. 122; Hong, supranote 1 at 386-87. In contrast, under the Bankruptcy Act,
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The Receiver must consult the tax collector if the reorganization plan
proposes a postponement of tax payments for less than one year, and the
Receiver must get the tax collector's consent to postpone tax payments for
more than one year, or to reduce or exempt payments.'
Therefore, Heavy Duty's $lm tax liability will not be given
preferential treatment in the reorganization procedure. 2 The Receiver may
suspend the collection of Heavy Duty's tax for one year, once the tax
collector is consulted."13 The Receiver may petition the court to suspend
the collection of Heavy Duty's taxes for more than one year, but the tax
collector must consent." 4 Also, the court may, on its own accord or on the
Receiver's petition, make the tax claim an unsecured reorganization claim
subject to the reorganization plan." 5
E. Deferred Reorganization Claims
Reorganization creditors with deferred claims" 6 are mainly those with
claims from interest accrued after commencement of the reorganization
proceeding, damages, or penalties for the debtor's failure to perform
contracts, expenses for participating in the reorganization procedure, claims
proceeding that are not
arising after commencement of the reorganization
117
fines.
and
benefits
common
of
claims
Heavy Duty's reorganization creditors with deferred claims will be the
City of Hope for damages due to Heavy Duty's rescission of the lease, the
creditors for the expenses incurred from participating in the reorganization
procedure, and the bankers and creditors for interest accrued after the
commencement of the reorganization procedure.

tax claims enjoy preferential status. Id. at 386.
111. CRA art. 122; Hong, supra note 1, at 386-87.
112. CRA art 122; Young-Moo Kim & Chang-Rok Woo, A Brief Survey of Korean
Corporate Liquidation & Bankruptcy Law, in BUSINESS LAWS IN KOREA 418 (Chan-Jin

Kim ed., 1990).
113. CRA arts. 122.
114. Id. arts. 67(3), (4), 122.

115. Id. art. 67(3).
116. Id. art. 121.
117. Id.
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F. Shareholders
18
Shareholders are the residual claimants of the debtor's assets.
Heavy Duty's shareholders, however, are unlikely to receive anything after
the distribution of assets to the secured and unsecured creditors.
The priority of claims system may be considered fair because it treats
all creditors equally, according to their class. It is also designed to satisfy
the claims of creditors before the claims of shareholders. The priority of
claims system, however, may not be efficient because it requires the
consent of all security holders before the debtor could reduce its
obligations in the reorganization plan. Therefore, Heavy Duty must obtain
the consent of all its security holders before the reorganization plan could
be approved. Since, there is no distinction make between large and small
security holders, even a small security holder may be able to thwart Heavy
Duty's reorganization plan." 9

V. TREATMENT OF SECURED CREDITORS IN
REORGANIZATION AND BANKRUPTCY
20

Secured creditors may participate in the reorganization procedure.
The secured creditor remains secured up to the value of the asset, and is
given an unsecured deficiency claim for amounts exceeding the value of
the asset.' 2' Secured creditors must file claims with the Court within a
specified timeframe.122 In some instances, the secured creditor may request
a one month extension, 23 but its claims must be filed before creditors meet
to examine the draft reorganization plan.1 24 In filing its claims, the secured
creditor must submit evidence of the claim. 125
Secured creditors may form a group for preparing and adopting the
resolutions of the draft reorganization plan. 26 This group of secured
creditors, however, cannot include reorganization creditors (unsecured

118. Id. arts. 159, 228.
119. Hong, supra note 1, at 387 (noting that shareholder has the right to participate in
reorganization proceeding).
120. CRA art. 124(1); Hong, supra note 1, at 386.
121. CRA art. 124(2).
122. CRA art. 126.
123. CRA art. 127(1).
124. CRA art. 127(3).
125. CRA art. 126.
126. CRA art. 159(1).
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creditors) or shareholders.'1 7 Additionally, secured creditors may appoint
one or several Agent Commissioner(s) to act on their behalf. 2 8
A secured creditor has voting rights in proportion to the amount of the
value of the underlying assets to which its security interest is attached. 2 9
In the case where the secured right is less than value of the assets, the
secured creditor's voting right is in proportion to amount of the secured
claim. 30 An additional protection given to the secured creditor is that
three-fourths or more of the secured creditors have to vote on any
reorganization plan which proposes the postponement of payment of their
security rights. 3' Furthermore, in Korea, unlike in the United States, all
plan which proposes to
security holders must vote on a reorganization
32
reduce or exempt their security rights.
Thus, in reorganization, Heavy Duty's secured creditors would remain
secured up to the value of the office, the plant and the equipment, but they
may be undersecured. Heavy Duty's banks and suppliers are owed $5m
and $3m respectively. Heavy Duty's equipment, however, has a book
value of $2m, but its market value would be less because of its age. Also,
Heavy Duty's plant has a book value of $3m, but is worth less because of
its decaying condition. Therefore, Heavy Duty's main secured creditors
may be undersecured.
In a bankruptcy proceedings, however, Heavy Duty's secured creditors
would be treated differently. In Korea, there are six categories of claims
in a bankruptcy proceeding, namely, preference claims, secured claims,
fund claims, claims given preference under other statutes, general creditors
obligations and less preferred claims.'3 3 First, preference claim status
would be given to any tax claim if the mortgage on the company's plant
and building was established less than one year prior to the due date of the
tax.' 34 If the mortgage were established more than one year prior to the
due date of the tax liability then the mortgage claim will be given
preference over the tax claim.' 3 5 Therefore, unlike in a reorganization

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

CRA art. 159(2).
CRA art. 160.
See Id. art. 124(1), (3); Hong, supra note 1, at 388.
CRA art. 124(3).
Id. art. 205.
Id.
See BA art. 35; Kim & Woo, supra note 112, at 426-27.
Kim & Woo, supra note 112, at 426-27.
Id.
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proceeding, Heavy duty's tax claim of $lm will be a preferential claim in
a bankruptcy proceeding.
Second, a creditor's secured claims which is secured by a pledge or
by a mortgage is given a right of separation that is exercisable outside of
the bankruptcy proceedings.' 36 If the debt exceeds the asset, the balance
owed becomes a general obligation of the debtor. 37 Therefore, Heavy
Duty's mortgagee of the office may exercise its rights outside of
bankruptcy proceedings. Third, fund claims will include the costs of the
judicial proceedings, the tax claims, the expenses in managing bankrupt
estate, the claims arising from acts of the Receiver in managing the estate,
and the claims for the performance of contracts. 38 Fourth, claims given
preference under other statutes would be claims such as wages. 139 Fifth,
claims of general creditors obligations are claims where creditors may off
set amounts owed to the bankrupt, 4 ' or the shareholders may share equally
with the other general creditors. 14' Finally, less preferred claims are claims
such as the interest accrued after adjudication of bankruptcy, the damages
of contracts, the costs of participating
and penalties for non-performance
42
in bankruptcy, and any fines.
V1. PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR
MANAGERS AND DIRECTORS

Under the BA, management surrenders control of the bankruptcy when
the case is commenced in favor of a Receiver who manages the company.
Before management is reinstated the bankrupt must repay all creditors,
obtain a judicial discharge of its debts, or wait ten years. 43 Directors can
be held personally liable for fraud and sanctioned by fines or
imprisonment.'" Also, their movement may be restricted and court may
have custody of their persons. 45

136. BA arts. 84-88; Kim & Woo, supra note 112, at 426; Song, supra,note 85, at 923.
137. Kim & Woo, supra note 112, at 426-27.
138. BA art. 38.
139. Kim & Woo, supra note 112, at 426-27.
140. BA arts. 89, 95; Kim & Woo, supra note 112, at 426.
141. Kim & Woo, supra note 112, at 426.
142. See BA art. 37.
143. See BA arts. 358, 359; MHLD, supra note 13.
144. See BA art. 374; Kim & Woo, supra note 112, at 428.
145. BA art. 137, 138; Kim & Woo, supra note 112, at 428.
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Under the CRA, the company's directors are not automatically
removed from their positions with the filing of the reorganization
petition.'4 6 Once appointed, the Receiver will assume full control of the
debtor company. 7 Directors or auditors who remain in office shall have
year. 48
their term of office specified, but it would not exceed one
Additionally, directors of a company in reorganization face no personal
liability or professional penalties. If, however, the reorganization were
caused by acts of the directors or the auditors, they can be removed from
office. 49 Directors or auditors who resigned at the commencement of the
reorganization proceedings are not eligible for re-election after the
proceeding. 50
Vfl. CONCLUSION

It appears that a reorganization proceeding in Korea is similar in
general structure and features to a reorganization proceeding in the United
States. There are howerver, two striking differences between the two
countries. First, in Korea, all creditors, regardless of size, must approve
the reorganization plan. Second, in Korea the perception continues that
bankruptcy and, to a lesser extent, reorganization are socially unacceptable.
Even given these differences, Heavy Duty will probably choose to
reorganize under the laws of both countries and the outcomes may be quite
similar.

146. See Hong, supra note 1, at 385.
147. See CRA art. 53(1).
148. Id. arts. 220(2), (4).
149. See Id. art. 220(2).
150. See Id. art. 271-2; KPMG, supra note 10, at 191.

